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The aim of the paper is to present a dynamic control allocation architecture for the
design and development of reconfigurable and fault-tolerant control systems in aerial ve-
hicles. The baseline control system is designed for the nominal dynamics of the aircraft,
while faults and actuator saturation limits are handled by the dynamic control allocation
scheme. Coordination of these components is provided by a supervisor which re-allocates
control authority based on health information, flight envelope limits and cross coupling
between lateral and longitudinal motion. The monitoring components and FDI filters pro-
vide the supervisor with information about different fault operations, based on that it is
able to make decisions about necessary interventions into the vehicle motions and guar-
antee fault-tolerant operation of the aircraft. The design of the proposed reconfigurable
control algorithm is based on Linear Parameter-varying (LPV) control methods that uses
a parameter dependent dynamic control allocation scheme. The design is demonstrated on
the lateral axis motion of the NASA AirSTAR Flight Test Vehicle simulation model.
I. Introduction
A major goal in modern flight control system research is the need to pursue improved reliability and
environmental sustainability of safety critical systems [1, 16]. Faults and failures may result in loss of
performance and even in catastrophic harm or loss of life. For that reason, improving the safety and reliability
of commercial aircraft via improving the pilots abilities to counteract the faults and provide them the flight
envelope protection functions as long as possible are important priorities. Reconfigurable control methods
promise a way to compensate for failures or damage of flight control effectors by using the remaining flight
control surfaces to generate compensating forces and moments, via changes in the flight control algorithms.
The majority of faults can be detected immediately with system checks, but a few of them requires fault
detection and isolation methods (FDI). Combined with reconfigurable control methods they are considered
as active fault tolerant control (FTC), which assumes a well defined mechanism to actively detect and
counteract against faults in the system [31, 23]. In passive FTC controllers are fixed and are designed to be
robust against a class of presumed faults. This approach does not need a fault estimate (or detection) or
controller reconfiguration, but provides only limited fault-tolerant capabilities [40].
In general, a fault tolerant flight control system is required to perform failure detection, identification
and accommodation for sensor and actuator failures. Active FTC schemes can be broadly classified into
projection based and online controller redesign based approaches [29]. Numerous results have been proposed
related to both approaches in the past few years [12, 2]. More recently in a numerous research projects, within
the EU FP7 framework, focus on the environmental impact of the aircraft and hence higher performance is
required from the flight control system, with certifiable algorithms, leading to a paradigm shift from robust
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passive FTC towards active methods relying on switching, gain scheduled or linear parameter-varying (LPV)
methods.
The individual control components used in a vehicle system are often designed decoupled but are in
interaction or even conflict with each other in terms of the full vehicle. An integrated control system
is designed in such a way that the effects of a control system on other vehicle functions are taken into
consideration in the design process by addressing the various performance specifications. Redundancy on
sensor and actuator levels makes it possible to realize the same functionality using different sensor and
actuator configurations, i.e., control reconfigurations. Thus integrated design is motivated by the needs of
reconfigurable and reliable control, see, e.g., [30, 32]. Recently, several important papers have been presented
in this topic, see, e.g., [38, 33, 13].
A possible solution to integrated control is to set the design problem for the whole vehicle and include
all the performance demands in a single specification. Besides the complexity of the resulting problem the
formulation of a suitable performance specification is the main obstacle for this direct global approach. In the
framework of available design techniques the formulation and successful solution of complex multi-objective
control tasks are highly nontrivial, see, e.g., [15, 5].
Control allocation techniques - [4], [10], [39], [19], [17], [21], [18]
Another solution to the integrated control is a quasi decentralized control structure where the components
are designed independently, see, e.g., [37, 14].
In the present paper the control system is designed without addressing the current physical limits and
health status of the aircraft, for virtual control inputs, and a suitably chosen supervisor is scheduling the
control allocation scheme to address the current limitations of the plant, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
role of the supervisor is to meet performance specification in different operating modes, i.e. fault conditions,
saturations, and prevent the interference between flight control components. The supervisor has information
about the current operational mode of the vehicle, i.e., the various vehicle maneuvers or the different fault
operations gathered from monitoring components and fault-detection and identification (FDI) filters. The
supervisor is able to make decisions about the necessary interventions into the vehicle components and
guarantee the reconfigurable and fault-tolerant operation of the vehicle. These decisions are propagated to
the lower layers of control allocation while the LPV control design framework remains unchanged.
The present paper proposes a reconfiguration approach for lateral motion of a sub scale aircraft based
on the a priori synthesis of a Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) controller, which can be further extended
with longitudinal control with more performance specifications which can be effectively handled by a lower
complexity supervisor. The fault signal is obtained from an FDI filter and together with actuator saturation
limits they are used as scheduling parameters on which the parameter dependent dynamic control allocation is
scheduled, while the LPV controller remains unchanged, scheduled only with flight envelope parameters. The
prime advantage of this approach is that the synthesis results in a single multivariable controller with stability
and robustness guarantees for the closed-loop system, and fault tolerance is handled by the augmentation
with dynamic control allocation. The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief introduction
to the supervisory architecture. The vehicle model of the NASA AIRStar UAV are presented in Section III.
In Section IV the considerations related to controller synthesis are discussed followed by simulation results
in Section VI. Some conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. Architecture
The term configuration refers to a well-defined sensor and actuator set that is associated with a given
functionality. Control reconfiguration is motivated by the following requirements: the achieved control
performance in certain scenarios must be improved and an increased reliability in the presence of sensor or
actuator faults or improved performance in case of actuator saturation must be achieved. The term event
is related to the occurrence of such a scenario. A finite set of events E are always assumed. On a higher
level an event is handled based on a given functionality thus one can associate a certain event e ∈ E with
a set of configurations Ce. Reconfigurable control strategies define a policy S : E × C → Ce to select a
possibly new configuration K = S(e) when an event e occurs in a specific, usually baseline, configuration.
In a normal situation a baseline configuration is handled by a single local component, e.g., elevator for pitch
control, otherwise it is composed of several local components that can fulfill the same functional behavior,
e.g., elevator, engines and spoilers for generating pitch moment. The event set E , the corresponding class
of the configuration sets Ce and the policy S are determined in the preliminary step of the design. The
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specification of these elements may be a highly nontrivial task when considering the high number of flight
control surfaces and sensors onboard the aircraft.
A. Supervisor
The role of the supervisor is to coordinate the local components and handle the interactions between them.
Since the performance specifications of local controllers are often in conflict, the supervisor must also guar-
antee a balance or trade-off between them. This trade-off is formulated on the level of local controllers as
a result of engineering knowledge. However, when an event occurs the preferences. i.e., the trade-off levels,
are subject to change. This fact is reflected in the structure of the policy S. As an example, the effect of
actuator saturation may prevent a specific performance requirement to be fulfilled. The encountered per-
formance degradation might be treated as an event, if there is a configuration that potentially can improve
the performance, which in practical situations is closely related to a safety requirement. Recovering to the
normal parameters creates another event that makes the supervisor to select the baseline configuration.
In order to implement a transition defined by the policy S, a safety feature, the operation of a local
controller must be modified by a supervisory command. This is realized through a set of scheduling variables
that are transmitted to the local controllers. At a local level the behavior of the controller is affected by
these scheduling variables through the performance weighting functions. The difficulty in the supervisory
control is that global stability and performance are difficult to guarantee. The information provided by
the supervisor is composed of messages and signals sent by the monitoring components and fault detection
and isolation (FDI) filters. Based on this information the supervisor is able to make decisions about the
necessary vehicle maneuvers and guarantee reconfigurable and fault-tolerant operation of the vehicle and
send messages to the local controllers.
The design of the supervisor does not involve dynamical systems explicitly. However, due to the time
variation of the signals the designer should check the validity of relations between the momentary values of
the monitoring signals based on a temporal logic. The difficult part of the design is to ensure the correctness
of the specification, see [28, 26]. It must be stressed at this point that the baseline configurations handle only
a subset of actuators, associated with a given task (functionality). The hierarchy of the configurations and
corresponding scheduling variables ensure that the additional actuator(s) considered improve the stability
properties of the given functionality.
In contrast to the controller switching strategy the proposed approach uses a performance weighting
strategy. On the supervisor level the required configurations are defined uniquely by the specific values of a
set of marker signals. These marker signals are used as parameters on the level of control allocation. The task
of the supervisor design is to specify these marker signals in such a way that the different combinations of
their values define the specific event (functionality) in a unique way. The different combinations of the marker
signals encode the designers specification (option) in dealing with multi-objective or conflicting scenarios.
As an illustration consider the altitude tracking problem which is handled by using elevator. When the
vehicle is performing a maneuver, e.g., a flight level change or turning, the change in angle-of-attack (AoA)
might generate increased drag. The role of the engine is to provide thrust and keep the vehicle at constant
speed. However, using the engine with slow dynamics and the elevator with fast response might lead to stall.
Hence, to balance the contradicting requirements of altitude change and AoA limitation an active supervisor
has to handle reference commands and might have to blend between throttle and elevator used for tracking
commands while handling saturations. The current paper considers a supervisory framework with an aircraft
lateral motion, where in normal mode the bank angle (φ) commands and side speed (v) are followed by using
aileron and rudder deflections, but in case a fault occurs on the aileron the system is reconfigured to use
spoilers and differential engine thrust with the remaining authority of the aileron, as shown in Figure 1.
B. Local LPV Control
LPV techniques offer a systematic design methodology to address control of highly coupled, nonlinear un-
certain dynamic systems. The benefits of this approach include guaranteed global stability and robust
performance, and real-time implementation of these controllers [36]. Linear Parameter Varying control uses
the H∞-robust control framework. Where frequency dependent weighting functions are used to describe
the required properties of the controller. In the same manner as in linear time invariant case, the con-
troller synthesis has a weighted interconnection setup, where design weight are used to form the performance
specifications. The plant and the resulting controller are both parameter depending and to cast into an
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Figure 1. Schematics of the supervisory framework
optimization the parameter dependent closed-loop transmission is minimized. The induced L2 norm ([36])
can be minimized by a parameter varying controller in the form:[
x˙c(t)
u(t)
]
=
[
Ac(ρ(t)) Bc(ρ(t))
Cc(ρ(t)) Dc(ρ(t))
][
xc(t)
y(t)
]
, (1)
where ρ ∈ FP can be measured in realtime. By the appropriate selection of weights in the generalized
interconnection ( Fig. 3) the closed loop system G can be chosen such that the induced L2 norm of the
system can not overpass a certain level, denoted by γ.
The controller synthesis problem can be cast into a series of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs). More
interested reader is referred to [20], where the method is described in great details.
The real time application of the LPV controller requires, first, the off-line computation of the controller
and ρ has to be available in real time for scheduling. Therefore, this approach allows to construct an LPV
controller whose dynamics adjust according to variations in plant dynamics, such as mass, velocity, aero-
dynamic parameters, or fault states and maintain prescribed stability and performance along all parameter
trajectories.
C. Fault Detection
In analytical redundancy schemes, the resulting difference generated from the consistency checking of different
variables is called as a residual signal. The residual should be zero when the system is normal, and should
diverge from zero when a fault occurs in the system. This zero and non-zero property of the residual is used
to determine whether or not faults have occurred. Analytical redundancy makes use of a mathematical model
and the goal is the determination of faults of a system from the comparison of available system measurements
with a priori information represented by the mathematical model, through generation of residual quantities
and their analysis. Various approaches have been applied to the residual generation problem, the parity
space approach [6, 27, 24, 35]. Most of these design approaches refer to linear time-invariant (LTI) systems.
The geometric concept is further generalized to linear parameter-varying (LPV) systems by [3], while input
affine nonlinear systems are considered by [8]. The basic concepts underlying observer-based fault detection
and isolation (FDI) schemes are the generation of residuals and the use of an optimal or adaptive threshold
function to differentiate faults from disturbances, see the surveys of [11, 27]. The threshold function is
used to robustify the detection of the fault by minimizing the effects from false faults, disturbances and
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commands on the residuals. For fault isolation, the generated residual has to include enough information to
differentiate said fault from another, usually this is accomplished through structured residuals or directional
vectors. Robustness of the FDI algorithm is determined by its capability to decouple the filter performance
outputs from disturbances, errors, and unmodelled dynamics. In the present paper the fault detection
filter is not designed, only a simplified representation is available based on the results from elevator FDI
on commercial aircraft [34]. It has an approximate dynamics, which estimates the loss of efficiency of the
elevator surface, which assuming a jamming fault on one of the two elevators reaches a value of 0.5, with
dynamics of GFDI = 5s+5 , resulting in model discrepancy, leading to uncertainty in the LPV scheduling
variable, during the fault detection transient.
III. Vehicle Model
An effective resource for experimentally testing fight control algorithms, including adaptive control algo-
rithms, is the Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) testbed at NASA Langley Research
Center [25]. The primary AirSTAR flight test vehicle is a turbine powered 5.5% dynamically scaled model
of a civilian transport aircraft, often referred to as the Generic Transport Model (GTM). The GTM has
a wing span of 7ft, and weighs around 55lbs. Under normal operations, it flies at an altitude of 700 to
1100ft, with an airspeed between 70 and 85 knots. The currently used T-2 test aircraft is shown in Figure
2. Significant wind tunnel and flight testing has been performed to identify the flight dynamics of the GTM
[7]. A nonlinear simulation model of the aircraft dynamics has been developed and is readily available to
the research community. Experimental control algorithms are easily embedded in this simulation model for
verification prior to flight testing [9]. Hence, the AirSTAR testbed is a highly effective for experimental
flight control research through its flexible architecture and rapid implementation and testing cycle. GTM
Figure 2. The NASA AIRStar vehicle.
nonlinear simulation model is trimmed to steady level flight at 60 to 100 knots at 10 knots interval and
linearized to obtain a set of linear models of the aircraft dynamics. A twelve state, full-order linear model is
generated for the given flight condition. The four states governing longitude, latitude, altitude, and heading
are eliminated as they have no impact on the flight dynamics. The remaining eight states, reduced-order
model fully describes the longitudinal, lateral, and directional dynamics of the aircraft. Coupling between the
longitudinal and lateral/directional axes is limited, and can be neglected for the purpose of control design.
Hence, the lateral controller described here is designed independently of the longitudinal controller.
A four state model, decoupled from the eight state reduced-order model, captures the primary lateral
flight dynamics of the GTM. The states of the model are side speed v[m/s], roll rate p[rad/s], yaw rate
r[rad/s], and roll angle φ[rad]. The control inputs to the model have significant redundancy, left and right
aileron deflection δa,L, δa,R[rad], upper and lower rudder δr,U , δr,L[rad], inner and outer spoiler deflection
δsp,I , δsp,O[rad], and left, right throttle δTHR,L, δTHR,R[%]. Due to the physical limits of the spoilers and
their symmetric effect on the lateral dynamics the control inputs are sent to the left spoilers in case of
positive demand and to the right spoilers in case of opposite demand. The lateral LPV state-space model of
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Figure 3. Block diagram of baseline lateral control design for GTM aircraft
the GTM between 60 and 100 knots is approximated with an affine LPV model in the form of:

v˙
p˙
r˙
φ˙
 = (A0 +AV Vcas)

v
p
r
ψ
+ (B0 +BV Vcas)

δa,L
δa,R
δr,U
δr,L
δsp,I
δsp,O
δTHR,L
δTHR,R

(2)
with outputs of all four states, where the C = I4×4 matrix is constant. The A0, AV , B0, BV affine LPV
coefficients are obtained with least square fit on the pointwise LTI plants. The plant is augmented with first
order actuator dynamics of Ga = 31.42s+31.42 , Gr =
29.85
s+29.85 , Gsp =
26.7
s+26.7 , Geng =
−0.1474s+0.7314
s2+1.336s+0.7314 on ailerons,
rudders, spoilers and throttle, respectively. Sensor dynamics are omitted due to the high quality of the
sensors onboard. An additional input is the right aileron fault, which has the same input direction as the
aileron input, but the fault signal is the opposite of the aileron command, leading to the cancellation of the
second column in the corresponding B matrix in case of jamming.
IV. Baseline Controller Design
The system interconnection (Fig. 3) addressing the parameter dependent controller synthesis proposed
to solve the yaw angle and side velocity tracking problem assuming noise and exogenous disturbances is
detailed in the following.
Model matching is achieved by filtering the reference signal through a "handling-qualities" model to
achieve smooth behavior with adequate speed of response for bank angle and side speed commands. The
main control objectives, to keep the error between the plant outputs φ, v and the desired handling-quality
responses hqφ = 9s2+6s+9 ;hqv =
6.25
s2+5s+6.25 low are weighted across frequency with Wφ =
100
s2+2s+1 ;Wv =
20 100s2+20s+100 across all parameter range, trading off good steady state tracking with degraded perfor-
mance at frequencies higher than 5 rad/s. Actuator usage is penalized in the design with weights of
Wact = diag(1/20; 1/20; 1/30; 1/30; 1/15; 1/45; 1/25; 1/25), corresponding to the maximum actuator deflec-
tions respecting the physical limits of the individual control effectors. Characteristics of the noise is captured
by Wn = diag(0.01;pi/180;pi/180; 0.04;pi/180) with constant magnitude across frequency and higher noise
on pitch and yaw rate sensors than on bank angle due to the sensors used.
The weights are optimized with linear point design first, at 5 points of the parameter space ρ1 = [80 : 5 :
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100] in the LPV model. The present method does not take advantage of parameter dependent performance
weights, which might improve the balancing of the problem to require higher tracking performance at oper-
ating ranges where the system dynamics are faster. During the pointwise H∞ synthesis the γ performance
level ranges between 1.397 and 1.919, with lower values at higher speeds. The LPV synthesis with unbounded
parameter rate, with constant Lyapunov function leads to a higher γ performance level, the L2 gain is 1.938.
This is a consequence of using a single, parameter dependent LPV controller, where the parameter rates can
be unbounded.
In the baseline control design all actuators are assumed to be used, with their maximum deflection limits,
and the control allocation is assigning the correct amount respecting the supervisory commands, according
to the health status and saturation of the actuators.
V. Dynamic input allocation for LPV systems
This paper extends the dynamic input allocator introduced in [39] to linear parameter-varying systems.
For this, we consider the following linear parameter-varying control systems consisting of an LPV plant and
an LPV baseline controller:
x˙ = A(ρ)x+B(ρ)u+Bd(ρ)d x˙c = Ac(ρ)xc +Bc(ρ)uc +Br(ρ)r
z = Cz(ρ)x+Dz(ρ)u+Dzd(ρ)d yc = Cc(ρ)xc +Dc(ρ)uc +Dr(ρ)r
y = C(ρ)x+D(ρ)d uc = y
(3)
where on the plant’s side x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rnz , y ∈ Rny , u ∈ Rnu and d are the state, the performance output (e.g.
tracking error), the measured output, the control input and a disturbance, respectively. On the controller’s
side, xc, uc, r are the controller state, the input to the controller and the reference. In nominal case, without
input allocation u = yc.
Input allocation can be applied if there is a control redundancy in the plant, that is when the same
output response y can be generated by different control actions. If this redundancy is available then a control
allocator can be placed between the plant and the controller (Fig. 4) in order to select an optimal control
input u without generating any (or at least any significant) change in the original closed loop behavior. By
using on-line input reallocation several nonlinear effects (e.g. control input limitations) or structural system
change (e.g. actuator failure, actuator performance loss) can be treated so that the nominal performance
is not or just slightly affected. Following the terminology of [39] we say that the plant in REF is strongly
input redundant if the parameter-dependent kernel space N (ρ) = ker
[
B(ρ)
D(ρ)
]
is nonempty. Strong input
redundancy makes it possible to modify the control input so that the modification becomes totally unseen
from the output. The input allocator is defined by the following dynamical system
w˙ = −αKN (ρ)Wu (4)
u = yc +N (ρ)w (5)
where W is a positive definite matrix weighting the inputs (the larger the weight the smaller the utilization
of the corresponding control input) and K > 0, α > 0 influences the dynamics of w and are chosen to ensure
closed loop stability. In case of strong redundancy, the nominal closed loop system is dynamically separated
from the allocator, so the stability of (5) can be independently analyzed. In this case, α = 1 can be chosen
and V = 12w
TK−1w can be used as a Lyapunov function for (5) [39]. (Of course, it is possible and beneficial
to choose K to be parameter-dependent, since this is equivalent to choosing parameter-dependent Lyapunov
function for the allocator dynamics.)
Effect of actuator dynamics. If the dynamics of the actuators are not negligible, the strong input
redundancy of the plant does not imply the existence of an input allocator. The reason is that the input
direction matrix
[
B(ρ)
D(ρ)
]
of the augmented plant+actuators system will be of full rank in general, which im-
plies that the kernel space becomes empty and thus the redundancy is lost. The plant-side input redundancy
can be preserved only if all of the actuators have same dynamics. If the actuators are different but have
similar dynamic characteristics, then it is possible to design a simple (e.g. pole-placement) controller, which
makes their behaviour equal. As a result, the actuators will be seen equal by the controller, so the input
redundancy remains.
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Computing the parameter-dependent kernel. The parameter-dependent kernel N (ρ) can be ob-
tained by following the algorithm implemented in the LFR Toolbox [22], [22]. The first step is rewriting the
input matrix M(ρ) =
[
B(ρ)
D(ρ)
]
in (upper) LFT form i.e.
M(ρ) = Fu(M,∆) = M21∆(I −M11∆)−1M12 +M22, ∆ = diag(ρ1I1, . . . , ρrIr)
Providing that M22 has full row rank one can choose a Q ∈ ImM⊥22 ∩ Rnu−ny×nu such that M¯(ρ) =
[
M(ρ)
Q
]
is invertible. Then
N (ρ) = M¯(ρ)−1
[
0
Inu−ny×nu
]
= Fu
([
M¯11 − M¯12M¯T22M¯21 M¯12M¯−122
−M¯−122 M¯21 M¯−122
]
,∆
)
(6)
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Figure 4. Dynamic input allocation scheme
VI. Reconfigurable control design for GTM lateral aircraft model
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Figure 5. Dynamic input allocation for GTM aircraft
The aircraft components are designed with life expectancy suiting to their normal usage. Some actuators
(e.g. ailerons) are designed for continuous actuation while others (e.g. spoilers) are assumed to be used only
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in certain maneuvers. The controllers designed for the aircraft have to use all available actuators but have
to be aware of these limitations: during normal flight conditions it is desirable to keep certain actuators (e.g.
spoilers) in passive mode until they are really needed. As for the active actuators (e.g.ailerons) it is important
to respect their physical limitations. Although these requirements can be coded into the weighting functions
used in the baseline control synthesis, the obtained controller, due to its linearity, is unable to strictly observe
these restrictions. The first goal of control reallocation is therefore to distribute the control effort of the
baseline controller so that each actuator works in its prescribed operating domain.
The normal operation can be maintained until a system failure occurs. If a critical component (e.g.
actuator or sensor) fails, the main goal is to accommodate the fault effect in order to avoid the total loss of
control. In several fault scenarios the control reallocation is an efficient method to save the aircraft. Control
reallocation means the redistribution of control energy among the (healthy) actuators so that the stability
of the aircraft is preserved and the flight performance loss is minimized as much as it is possible. If the plant
is strongly input redundant and this redundancy is enough to handle the fault, the nominal behavior can be
recovered without performance degradation. This is the consequence of such property of strong redundancy
that the reconfiguration is totally hidden from the output.
In order to reconfigure the control input the allocator has to acquire information about the fault. For
this a Fault Detection and Isolation unit is required, which collects all of the control inputs and measured
outputs and based on the change of the aircraft’s behavior it detects the presence and determines the place
and severity of the fault. In the paper we do not focus on the design of FDI filters, we assume that the fault
and the faulty component are quickly and reliable detected.
In the sequel we demonstrate the efficiency of input reallocation algorithm derived in section V both in
normal flight conditions and in the presence of actuator fault. (The block diagram of reconfigurable control
architecture can be seen in Fig. 5.) In both cases we use the baseline controller presented in section IV. For
the normal flight conditions we define the flight scenario as follows:
Scn1 Do not use spoilers, keep the physical limitations of the active actuators: |δa| ≤ 20, |δr| ≤ 30,
|δTHR| ≤ 25.
To apply the allocator structure of section V, the first step is the computation of the kernel space N (ρ). It
can be checked that for the aircraft model of section III, consisting of the LPV lateral dynamics and the 6
actuator models (we do not want to modify the throttle inputs during reconfiguration), the kernel space is
3 dimensional and can be given in LFT form as follows:
N (p) = Fu(M˜, I3×3Vcas)
where M˜ comes from (6). By measuring Vcas the actual N (p(t)) can be determined at each time instant.
Since the dynamics of the actuators are different but have similar characteristics, an output feedback
controller has been applied locally to transform the actuators to common dynamics
Gact =
31
s+ 31
To satisfy the conditions of Scn1 the following weighting function was applied:
W = diag(w1, w2, w3, w4, 500, 500) (7a)
where large weight (w5 = w6 = 500) was chosen for the spoilers and dynamic weights with large gain at the
limits was set for the ailerons and rudders:
wi = (20(1 + )− |sat20(ui)|)−1, i = 1, 2 (7b)
wj = (30(1 + )− |sat30(uj)|)−1, j = 3, 4 (7c)
Here sats(·) = max(min(·, s),−s) is the standard saturation function, ui is the i-th component of u and
 = 0.01.
The next scenario is a faulty case, when we assume that the lower rudder gets stuck at 0 deflection and
it cannot be used in the control at all. To compensate its loss the spoilers are switched on and the allocator
is modified to redistribute the control effort (the output of the baseline controller) among the available
actuators. The scenario Scn2 can be defined more formally as follows:
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Figure 6. Reference signals φref , vref and scheduling parameter Vcas
Scn2. Do not use the faulty rudder, activate the spoilers and respect the physical constraints of all active
actuators: |δa,R| ≤ 20, |δr| ≤ 30, |δTHR| ≤ 25, |δsp,I | ≤ 15, |δsp,O| ≤ 45.
The weighting matrix corresponding to Scn2 was chosen as follows:
W = diag(w1, w2, w3, 500, w5, w6)
wi = (20(1 + )− |sat20(ui)|)−1, i = 1, 2 (8)
w3 = (30(1 + )− |sat30(u3)|)−1,
w5 = (15(1 + )− |sat15(u5)|)−1, w6 = (45(1 + )− |sat45(u6)|)−1
The simulation results can be seen in Fig. 6-12. In Fig. 6 the reference signals for φ and v are plotted
together with the trajectory of the scheduling parameter Vcas. The next three figures (Fig. 7-9.) present
the closed loop behaviour in the case when rudder jamming fault occurs at t = 12s but the fault is not
compensated. In the first 12s Scn1 is realised: weighting (7) is active, the spoilers are switched off (their
limits are set to 0 in the saturation block) and all other actuators output are limited by saturation. After the
12th second the faulty actuator is switched off, the spoilers are switched on, but no reconfiguration is applied.
Fig. 9 proves clearly that the activation of the spoilers is not enough to regain the control performance.
The results of the simulation in case of active input reallocation is plotted in Figs 10-12. The first 12s is
the same as in the previous simulation. At the 12th sec. the fault is detected and the input allocation (sec.
V) with parameters α = 0.01, K = I and weighting (8) is activated to satisfy the requirements of Scn2.
Fig. 12 proves that the reallocation is capable of regaining the performance of the baseline controller: the
aircraft can track the reference signal while all of the actuator inputs satisfy the prescribed constraints.
VII. Conclusion
The paper extends the dynamic input allocator presented in [39] to linear parameter varying control
systems. For this, the definition of strong input redundancy had to be revised and slightly modofoed, but
the simple allocator structure proposed by [39] could be preserved. The input allocation method was then
applied to the lateral control of NASA AirSTAR GTM aircraft to provide first an optimal actuator utilization
during normal flight conditions and then to reconfigure the control actions in case of aileron fault. It was
shown via simulation tests that the applied method is able to efficiently solve both tasks.
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Figure 7. Control inputs δa,L, δa,R, δr,U , δr,L in the case when rudder fault occurs at t = 12s and no input
reallocation is applied. (blue,green=saturated, red=unsaturated (output of the controller))
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Figure 8. Control inputs δsp,I , δsp,O, δTHR,L, δTHR,R in the case when rudder fault occurs at t = 12s and no input
reallocation is applied. (blue,green=saturated, red=unsaturated (output of the controller))
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Figure 9. Reference tracking in case of rudder fault without input reallocation. (blue=reference,
green=output)
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Figure 10. Control inputs δa,L, δa,R, δr,U δr,L in the case when rudder fault occurs at t = 12s and input reallocation
is active. (blue,green=saturated, red=unsaturated (output of the controller))
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